4 on the assumption that Europe, and later the United States, are deemed 'exceptional'. In the process the story of the rise of the West is related in terms of an endogenous, evolutionary, unfolding intra-European process, wherein Europe's development into modernity was inscribed within its social structure such that its rise to the top was but an (a)historical fait accompli; that it was foretold, pre-ordained or written.
No less critically for many, though not all, Eurocentrics, such a developmental journey is deemed to have been absent in the East, wherein the East is constructed as the West's inferior opposite Other and is denied the progressive ability to self-generate. Thus the East is said to be governed by "irrational", regressive institutions -eg., Oriental despotic states rather than Western liberal states, mystical other-worldly religions rather than rational Protestantism, collectivist rather than individualist social structures, superstitious mentalities rather than scientific ones, and so on. All of which culminates in the point that for many, though not all, Eurocentric scholars, because the East is deemed to be incapable of self-development so it was incumbent upon the West to engage in an imperial or global civilizing mission in order to 'kick-start' the East so that it could join the Western developmental track that would eventually deliver it to the terminus of Western-based capitalist civilization (or communism for Marxism).
At this point, the second-step of the Eurocentric big bang theory cuts in. For having risen to the top the West expands outwards to remake the world in its own image.
Or, to complete the metaphor: the big bang of capitalist development exploded spontaneously in Europe in the 16 th century and thereafter Western civilization diffused outwards to remake the earthly universe in its own image. After 1492 European civilization is thought to have diffused through trading-post empires in Asia and formal imperialism in the Americas and, later on, through formal imperialism in large parts of Asia and Africa as well as through informal imperialism in the Middle East. In the Eurocentric vision the period covering 1492 to 1945 is in effect thought of as one that is marked by Western-led "proto-globalization" and is narrated in terms of a Western relay race wherein the baton of global power was passed from the Spanish and Portuguese to the Dutch, who then passed it to the British and French, while the final leg of global economic power and of globalization was run in record time by the American anchor man. The essential task performed by these Western runners was to smash down the obstructive walls or "regressive barriers" that allegedly divided a barbaric and savage
East from the civilized West.
In this article I advance an alternative non-Eurocentric vision which, in effect, inverts the standard Eurocentric chronology and explanation. This comprises three key inversions:
1) Europe was not the early but a late-developer and that East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa as well as India were the original earlier developers. Consistent with late development theory I argue that the West was only able to develop and break through to modernity because it borrowed, assimilated and appropriated the more advanced Eastern technologies, ideas and institutions.
2) Eurocentric world history assumes that the rise of the West came first and then globalization followed. Instead I shall argue that Europe modernized in the first global era (1492-c.1830) that was dominated by Orientalization or Easternization.
That is, Orientalization enabled the rise of the West. came. Thus I prefer to talk about the "return" of Asia rather than the "rise" of Asia.
Afro-Eurasian Regionalization/Eastern-led Proto-Globalization
Here I break the long period of c.650-1800 into two phases beginning with the Afro- arbitrage system (or a "global silver-recycling process"), with China constituting its pivot. Because the Chinese economy was the strongest in the world right down to the nineteenth century [9, 13] , that its monetary system was based on silver and that it enjoyed significant trade surpluses which were financed by silver meant that the price of silver relative to gold in China was about twice that of the equivalent figure in Europe were then shipped via the Middle Passage to the Americas where they were put to work in the mines and plantations, the products of which were then shipped back to Britain before the whole process began anew. While this was certainly a significant development so far as linking up the world was concerned nevertheless the key point is that much of the impetus to the Atlantic system was provided by the gravitational pull of the East -India and China in particular. For, as we have seen, a good proportion of the silver that was plundered by the Europeans in the Americas -somewhere between a third [7] and two-thirds [9] -wended its way across to China and India, either eastwards via the Cape Route and the West-Asian dominated overland and sea routes or westwards via the trade route that went from Chile to China via the Philippines on board the Spanish Manila galleons. It might even be the case that Indian and especially Chinese demand for this silver was crucial in maintaining the profitability of the American mines [9] .
Pulling all this together it can be concluded that both the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies, which were dominated by Asian merchants, provided a strong input into the reproduction of the Atlantic economy. And while this is not to say that the European role in the Atlantic system was unimportant it is, nevertheless, to say that the Pacific/Indian
Ocean trading systems helped suck the Europeans into both these systems as well as sustain Europe's role in the Atlantic system. This is brought into further relief by the point that the Europeans before 1800 did not dominate the Asian trading system but in fact played a subordinate role, being dependent upon local Asian knowledge, Asian capital (much of which was provided by rich Indian Banians), and the goodwill of Asian rulers -in addition to the point that the EICs derived their profits from inserting themselves into the Asian-led system [9, 13] . Indeed they even had no choice but to cooperate with the Asians in such matters as the sharing of trading ships.
However, standard Eurocentric narratives deny that the period between 1450/1492
and 1830 qualified as "global", preferring to see it as an era of proto-globalization wherein the Europeans broke down the walls behind which "barbaric" and "savage"
societies hid from the world thereby preparing the ground for the future emergence of 13 thick globalization. It is certainly true that the quantity of trade in this era was well below that of the post-1945 era. But trade was only one factor of relevance here. Most important of all was the diffusion of "resource portfolios" from East to West. As I mentioned earlier, all the key developments that we associate with the rise of the West were significantly enabled by the borrowing or assimilation of Eastern resource portfolios.
This is important to rethink the way that we traditionally conceive of the rise of the West.
But at this stage of proceedings another key point emerges. For one of the key properties of globalization is that which David Held and his co-authors [12] describe as high "impact propensity", by which they are referring to the point that globalization only properly exists when it can be demonstrated that global flows can re-organize societies that are geographically very far apart. In the following section I shall argue that various global flows that went from East to West were so significant that they enabled a fundamental re-organization of Europe -specifically enabling its transition from feudalism to capitalism -thereby suggesting that the impact propensity of such flows was in fact sufficiently high to warrant the term globalization. Space precludes a full discussion here but to illustrate my claim I shall consider some of the influences that India, the Islamic Middle East and China imparted on the rise of the West.
Indian, West Asian and Chinese influences on the rise of the West
Before I chart some of the key non-Western influences on the rise of the West it is worth pausing for a moment to consider a key issue that addresses one of the enduring challenges to global-dialogical history -notably the problem of proof concerning transmissions. For the response, often made by Eurocentrics, when confronted by the claim that a certain idea/institution/technology came from outside Europe, is that it could have been an independent European invention, thereby rendering its non-European origins either irrelevant or simply coincidental. Often it is not possible to prove a particular transfer, with circumstantial evidence often being the only "proof" offered.
This is discussed by Arun Bala [2] . He agrees that it is insufficient simply to assert cross- not dry up after the 14 th century, as is commonly assumed. Here, he and others [17, 24] reveal the vital role played by the Kerala school between the 14 th and 16 th centuries with the breakthrough in developing the "infinite series" being crucial. Again, this period was marked by three key thinkers -Madhava, Nilakantha, and Jyesthadeva.
One of the defining aspects of the Renaissance is the concept of perspectivism; something which is said to have originated within Italian art. But perspectivism reaches back to the prior work of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen, 965-1030 CE) and his optical revolution that emerged at the turn of the second millennium CE. His unique move was to replace the medieval "extramission theory" with his "intromission theory". He also drew on many of the mathematical breakthroughs that were pioneered by other Muslim thinkers such as Ibn S n (Avicenna) and al-Biruni. The upshot was that it entrenched mathematical realism (which went beyond the stage reached by the ancient Greeks).
Moreover, the new optical theory led to a shift in the perceptual sensibilities of the Europeans, bringing to light "perspectivism" wherein the artist represented objects as they appeared to the observer. Given that mathematical perspectivism was central to the Renaissance, al-Haytham's position within this epistemic revolution was probably highly significant [2] .
Last, but certainly not least, the Muslims (especially the Mutazilites) propagated the idea that man was a free and rational agent -supposedly one of the leitmotifs of modern European thinking. Such an idea emerged not long after the Prophet The question now becomes: were there plausible transmission paths that could enable this knowledge diffusion or was it all just a case of coincidental and independent inventions in the West and East? Bala points out that there was a clear transmission path that reached from India to Europe at the very time that the Europeans were seeking to develop mathematical understanding [2] . Given that when Vasco da Gama landed in China. It is highly likely that it was the Muslims who had invented the lateen sail which enabled them to sail into a headwind. For European oceanic sailing relied on the lateen sail; something which proved to be vital for the Portuguese as they explored the western coastline of Africa given that strong headwinds blew up in just south of Cape Bojador.
Because the lateen sail led to a zigzagging (triangular) path so the use of geometry and trigonometry was required in order to calculate the linear distance path travelled. As I have argued already, these mathematical procedures were passed on to the Iberians primarily by the Muslims. And because the strong tides south of Cape Bojador off the west coast of Africa could beach a ship, so knowledge of lunar cycles were required (given that the moon governs the tides). These too were passed on by the Muslims via the Jewish cartographer Jacob ben Abraham Cresques, who resided in Portugal. Added to this was knowledge of solar calendars, more accurate navigational charts, latitude and 20 longitude tables, as well as the astrolabe and quadrant [13, 27] , all of which originated in West Asia. Notable too is that the square hull and stern-post rudder (which was a crucial nautical technology that enabled oceanic sailing) was invented in China around 400 CE.
Moreover, the triple mast system and the compass also emanated from China and the latter was deployed in Chinese ships by 1090 with this invention reaching Italy around 1185.
The European voyages were, however, unique in one sense: that the European ships were armed with cannon. For prior to the European incursion into the Indian Ocean
Asian trade was a largely peaceful affair. But there is evidence to suggest that the cannon was invented by the Chinese around 1290 (where it was known as the "eruptor"). This is Ascertaining the transmission of the cannon to Europe is, however, based only on circumstantial evidence. Joseph Needham and his colleagues [22] suggest that this could particularly the idea of "rationality". And such ideas were readily available given that there was a wealth of Chinese texts and pamphlets that flooded into Europe throughout much of the 18 th century, many of which were brought back by the Jesuits [18] .
In the Anglo-Saxon canon the central European political economist was the Scotsman, Adam Smith. But while Anglo-Saxons celebrate Smith as the first political economist nevertheless, as is well-known among political economists, behind Smith lay François Quesnay, the French physiocrat. But less well-known is that behind Quesnay lay Confucius. So profound was the Confucian element in his thinking that Quesnay was frequently referred to as the "European Confucius" at the time. And it was, in fact,
Quesnay rather than Smith, who was the first European to critique the ideas of mercantilism. The term "physiocracy" means the "rule of nature". This was important insofar as it located agriculture as a vital source of wealth (which later informed the idea of the British agricultural revolution). Critically, though, Quesnay argued that agriculture could only be fully exploited when producers were set free from the arbitrary interventions of the state. For only then could the "natural laws" of the market cut in (as the Chinese had long realized). Quesnay's debt to Chinese conceptions of political economy was found in many ideas, the most important being that of wu-wei -which is translated into French as laissez-faire. Indeed as early as about 300 CE Kuo Hsiang described wu-wei as that which lets "everything be allowed to do what it naturally does, so that its nature will be satisfied" (although it should be noted that the concept pre-dates the start of the Common Era).
The upshot of all this is not to say that the European Enlightenment was the pure product of Chinese ideas, for clearly there were some Enlightenment thinkers who rejected China as a model for Europe -most notably Montesquieu and Fénelon. But it would be remiss to entirely ignore some kind of Chinese input in this major epistemic turning point of Western civilization.
Chinese origins of the British agricultural revolution?
Turning now to the British agricultural revolution it is fair to say that the key inventions comprised: the iron mouldboard plough, Jethro Tull's seed drill and horse-drawn hoe, the horse-powered threshing machine and the rotary winnowing machine, as well as breakthroughs in crop rotations. But all of these found precedent in sixth-century China.
Taking each in turn it is notable that the iron mouldboard plough was first invented in China before the sixth century. It is curious that this was not copied before the eighteenth century given that the European medieval plough was so inefficient and that knowledge of this Chinese technology could have been relayed back in the thirteenth century.
Nevertheless, what we do know is that in 1730 the Rotherham plough made its appearance in England and that this plough was borrowed from the Dutch (who termed it the "bastard plough"). But were the Dutch the original inventors of the bastard plough?
It might be thought that the Rotherham and bastard ploughs were invented independently of the Chinese curved iron mouldboard plough. But Francesca Bray has 24 dismissed this possibility on the grounds that the new European ploughs far too closely resembled the much earlier Chinese invention. Indeed, Chinese iron mouldboard ploughs perfectly pre-empted the model that was described as late as 1784 by the European, James Small (who is usually credited as the pioneer of the plough). Moreover, the sudden emergence of the new European ploughs, which were so radically different to those that had been used for about a millennium, suggests that this could not have been mere coincidence. In any case, it is clear that the Dutch (who had resided in East Asia in the seventeenth century) had brought back the actual Chinese model and created the bastard plough [5] .
The rotary winnowing machine was a major breakthrough in that it separated out the husks and stalks of the grain after the harvest. But it was long preceded by the Chinese rotary winnowing machine which stems back to the second century BCE [5] .
Once again there is evidence that it was brought over from China, having been brought to
France by the Jesuits in the 1720s and the Netherlands at the hands of Dutch sailors between 1700 and 1720. Additionally, various models were brought back to Sweden, where they were adapted by Swedish scientists such as Jonas Norberg. Interestingly, Norberg openly announced that 'I got the initial idea… from three separate models brought here from China' [5] .
Prior to the deployment of the seed-drill, seeds were laboriously planted by hand, which was a highly inefficient business given that so much of the crop was lost since much of the sown-seed ended up with a clumping of the plants that then had to compete for light, moisture and nutrients. This contrasted with the Chinese multi-tube seed drill first invented in the third century BCE., which had enabled the development of a highly efficient agricultural system [28] . Europe very belatedly caught up with China once Jethro Tull had apparently discovered the seed-drill. This device sowed the seed in regular rows and at a specific depth while the hoeing device was responsible for keeping the weeds down and ventilating the soil.
Tracing the diffusion of this invention from China is not easy. Here we come across one of the dilemmas of the diffusion process for what diffused was not the model but the idea, given that Tull's model was quite different in various aspects to the Chinese models. But it is highly likely that the idea of the drill was transmitted through the diffusion of books and manuals on this device that were readily available at that time. irons, or plough-sheares, so that at one bout he made 3 furrowes; and because the ground was good for the seed which we here call Feazols or Kidney-beanes; this seed was put, as it were, in a bushel, or square dish fastened upon the upper part of the plough, in such manner, that with the motion thereof the Beanes were gently scattered upon the earth as some falleth upon a Milstone, at the moving of the Mill-hopper; so at the same time the land is plowed and sown with hopes of a future crop (Semedo cited in [19] ).
It is striking to note that Tull's basic principles of the seed drill, outlined in his book, Horse-Hoeing Husbandry (1733), were a near word-for-word reproduction of those laid out in the original Chinese manuals, which dated back to the third century BCE [5] .
Indeed, Bray claims that Tull's system so closely resembles 'the farming practice of
Northern China that one is tempted to assume that Tull borrowed the system lock, stock and barrel from China' [5] . Moreover, Bray also points out:
One might argue that the European seed-drill was a logical development from earlier [European] horticultural techniques such as setting, yet it cannot be fortuitous that European inventors suddenly started working on machines to sow several rows of corn simultaneously in straight lines, just like the Chinese machines, precisely at the period when information about
Chinese agriculture was becoming freely available [5] .
Last, but not least, there is the issue of crop rotations, which are largely associated with Turnip Townshend's innovations. The new crop-rotation systems, which were heralded by the British as one of the crucial agricultural breakthroughs, were fully preempted by the Chinese. Strikingly, the Chinese had developed many such systems as early as the sixth-century, all of which were reported in the Chhi Min Yao Shu [5] . Once again, it is likely that this information, which was contained in various Chinese manuals that entered Europe after the mid-seventeenth century, could have directly influenced
Townshend, particularly as that it was round about this time that the British were interested in developing agriculture. Watt's engine stems back to Wilkinson's, nevertheless it is not usually acknowledged that the latter's engine shared many similarities with Wang's. Moreover, the Chinese box-bellows was a double-acting force and suction pump, which at each stroke expelled the air from one side of the piston while drawing in an equal amount of air on the other side. This shared a "close formal resemblance" to Watt's engine and, by the lateseventeenth century, the Chinese had developed a steam turbine [21] . Moreover, Chinese breakthroughs in gun manufacturing were significant, enabling the later invention of the steam-engine (given that the cannon or gun is in effect a one-cylinder combustion engine). And a further link of note is that one of the major challenges confronting James
Watt was the need to bore an airtight cylinder and that he had turned to John Wilkinson for help in this matter, given that Wilkinson owned a boring mill that was designed for cannon production.
Iron (and later steel) production formed, alongside cotton manufacturing, the twin pillar of the British industrial revolution. However, we know that the Chinese and the Indians were developing such industries well before the British. Given this, it is not 28 surprising that British producers (including Benjamin Huntsman of Sheffield) studied
Chinese and Indian production methods as late as the eighteenth century in order to develop their own iron and steel manufacturing techniques [4, 22] . The other great pillar of the British industrial revolution, cotton-manufacturing, might also have benefited from prior Eastern initiatives. Thus, while it is recognized that the British inventor, John
Lombe, set up the silk machines that would later become the model for the Lancashire cotton machines and that he borrowed his idea from the Italian machines, nevertheless it turns out that the latter were a replica of the earlier Chinese inventions from the thirteenth century [18] .
All in all, though, none of this is to say that the British were merely passive benefactors of Indian and especially Chinese, inventions for they surely did much insofar as they put everything together, the outcome of which was the development of per capita income at levels that had previously not been witnessed before in world history. And for all the Chinese technological prowess it is clearly the British, not the Chinese, who managed to invent the steam engine. Overall, then, part of the skill of the British was the ability to be open to the inventions of others.
Conclusion
Returning to the key goals of this article, the upshot of the discussion is three-fold. First, it challenges the first-step of the Eurocentric big bang theory of modernity/globalization, which presumes that the West was entirely self-made. For this obscures the point that the
West benefited from adapting earlier Eastern inventions. Second, the discussion suggests that the rise of the West occurred in significant part during the early global age in which Orientalization was the dominant process and Occidentalization the subordinate one. The discussion of the diffusion of Eastern "resource portfolios", therefore, performs a dual intellectual task: first, that it problematizes the self-made status that Eurocentrism awards the Europeans (and simultaneously brings into play the role of various Eastern peoples);
and second, that this diffusion constitutes a litmus test for the presence of early easternled globalization after about 1492 insofar as it evoked an impact propensity whereby
Europe was, at least in part, remade as a result of such global diffusions.
The third key point is that while Europe overtook China in the nineteenth century 
